The False Promise of Gleneagles: Misguided Priorities at the Heart of the New Push for African Development by Marian L. Tupy
In response to persisting poverty in Africa, representa-tives from the world’s eight leading industrializednations—Germany, Canada, the United States, France,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Russia—met in Glen-
eagles, Scotland, in 2005 and agreed on a three-pronged
approach to help Africa. They would increase foreign aid to
the continent, reduce Africa’s debt, and open their markets
to African exports. Unfortunately, aid has harmed rather
than helped Africa. It has failed to stimulate growth or
reform, and encouraged waste and corruption. For exam-
ple, aid has financed 40 percent of military spending in
Africa. Similarly, debt relief has failed to prevent African
countries from falling into debt again. 
Trade liberalization has the greatest potential to help
Africa emerge from poverty. Yet that is where the least
amount of progress has been made. Negotiations on trade
liberalization have ground to a halt, and the threat of protec-
tionism looms large as the current global economic slow-
down worsens.
The Gleneagles Summit, for all its good intentions, gave
rise to unrealistic expectations. The heavy emphasis on aid
and debt relief made Western actions appear to be chiefly
responsible for poverty alleviation in Africa. In reality, the
main obstacles to economic growth in Africa rest with
Africa’s policies and institutions, such as onerous business
regulations and weak protection of property rights. 
Africa remains the poorest and least economically free
region on earth. The West should do all it can to help Africa
integrate with the rest of the world. It should eliminate
remaining restrictions on African exports and end Western
farm subsidies. Africans, however, will have to make most
of the changes needed to tackle African poverty.
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Introduction:
A Brief Look at the 
State of Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) lags
behind the rest of the world in most indica-
tors of human well-being. Africans suffer
from (among other afflictions) shorter life
spans; higher rates of infant mortality; high-
er incidence of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis; and greater undernourishment
than people do in other parts of the world. 
Overall, Africa scored a mere 0.472 on the
United Nations’ 2006 Human Development
Index, which is measured on a scale from 0 to
1, with higher values denoting higher stan-
dards of living. In comparison to Africa, the
United States scored 0.948 (see Figure 1).1
That is not to say that there have been no
improvements in Africa over the last few
decades. Between 1961 and 2002, for example,
daily food supplies in terms of consumed calo-
ries increased in Africa from 2,055 to 2,207.
Infant mortality declined from 177 per 1,000
live births between 1950 and 1955 to 101 in
2003. Life expectancy at birth rose from 37.4
years between 1950 and 1955 to 45.6 years in
2003.2
Even so, according to data compiled by
Angus Maddison of the University of Gron-
ingen, the income gap between Africa and oth-
er regions rose between 1960 and 2003.3 In
1960, an average Western European was 6.5
2
Sub-Saharan
Africa lags 
behind the rest 
of the world in
most indicators
of human 
well-being.
Source: United Nations, Human Development Report 2006 (New York: United Nations, 2006), http://hdr.undp.org/hdr
2006/pdfs/report/HDR_2006_Tables.pdf.
Figure 1
United Nations Human Development Index Values for 2004 
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times richer than an average African. By 2003
that gap grew to 10.7 times. In 1960, an average
African was slightly richer than an average
inhabitant of Asia. By 2003, Asians were 2.4
times richer than Africans (see Figure 2).4
The poor performance of Africa is especially
telling considering the progress that other for-
merly poor parts of the world have made in
recent years. Between 1975 and 2005, for exam-
ple, Chinese and Indian incomes, adjusted for
inflation and purchasing power parity, rose by
888 percent and 174 percent respectively.5 In
Africa, incomes fell by 5 percent (see Figure 3).6
Not all countries in Africa are desperately
poor, and not all of them face the same chal-
lenges. Figure 4 shows differences in the stan-
dard of living among African countries as
measured by income per capita adjusted for
purchasing power parity. The annual income
of the inhabitants of the Seychelles, for exam-
ple, was $15,105 in 2006, while that of the
people of Burundi was a mere $629. On aver-
age, the Seychellois are 24 times richer than
the Burundians. 
Outliers aside (like the relatively well-off
tourist paradise of Seychelles), there is no deny-
ing that Africa has fallen far behind the devel-
oped world and that a sizable part of its 770
million people faces existential challenges that
developed countries have already consigned to
history in the past couple of centuries.7
The Gleneagles Summit:
Promises Made 
Spurred by the media, Hollywood stars,
musicians, and activists, the leaders from the
world’s eight leading industrialized nations
met between July 6 and 8, 2005, in the
Scottish town of Gleneagles to discuss Africa.
Joined by their African counterparts, the G8
leaders expressed their desire to help build “a
strong, peaceful and prosperous Africa.” 
Their ambitious aims included doubling
the size of Africa’s economy and trade by 2015,
delivering increased domestic and foreign
investment, lifting tens of millions of people
3
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Figure 2
Real Income of the Rest of the World Relative to Africa (1960–2003)
Source: Angus Maddison, “Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1–2003 AD,” http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/
Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_03-2007.xls. 
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out of poverty every year, saving millions of
lives a year, getting all children into primary
school, delivering free basic health care and
primary education for all, providing as close as
possible to universal access to treatment for
AIDS by 2010, generating employment and
other opportunities for young people, and
bringing about an end to conflict in Africa.
For their part, African leaders agreed to
“deepen transparency and good governance,
strengthen democratic institutions and process-
es, show zero tolerance for corruption, remove
all obstacles to intra-African trade, and bring
about lasting peace and security across the con-
tinent.”8 In return, the G8 agreed to a number of
initiatives, ranging from extra resources for
Africa’s peacekeepers who are tasked with pre-
venting and resolving conflicts in Africa, to
greater G8 support for the building of democra-
cy, better governance, transparency, and the
fight against corruption across the African con-
tinent. The G8 also promised “to boost invest-
ment in health and education, and to take
action to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and
other killer diseases.”9
This paper will not focus on the commit-
ments by African governments. Improvements
on peace and security, government efficiency
and transparency, free trade, and the rule of law
in Africa would be welcome news, and to the
4
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Figure 3
Percentage Increase in Per Capita GDP Adjusted for Inflation and Purchasing Power
Parity (1975–2005)
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators Online,” http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI.
%
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5Figure 4
African GDP per Capita Adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity in 2006 (constant 2000 international dollars)
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators Online,” http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI. 
Note: The World Bank database does not contain 2006 data for Liberia, Mayotte, Sao Tome, or Somalia.
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extent that the G8 can play a positive role in
helping Africa to achieve those goals, it should
do so. Rather, this paper will focus on three
commitments that the G8 made to Africa.
First, the G8 “agreed to double aid for Africa by
2010.” In real terms that increase would
amount to $25 billion in extra aid by 2010.
Second, the G8 “agreed that all of the debts
owed by eligible heavily indebted poor coun-
tries to the International Development Associ-
ation, the International Monetary Fund, and
the African Development Fund should be can-
celled.” Third, the G8 agreed to redouble their
“efforts to achieve a successful conclusion
across the whole of the Doha Development
Agenda . . . [and reaffirmed its] commitment to
open markets more widely to trade in agricul-
tural goods, industrial goods and services, and
in agriculture to reduce trade-distorting do-
mestic subsidies and eliminate all forms of
export subsidies by a credible end date.”10
The priorities set out by the G8, which put
aid and debt relief ahead of trade, are mis-
guided. Foreign aid to Africa has indeed
increased and its debt was reduced, but little
progress has been made on trade liberaliza-
tion—the only agreement reached by the G8
that could lead to lasting economic improve-
ments on the African continent. 
Foreign Aid: Time to End It
Between 1975 and 2005, per capita aid to
Africa averaged $24.60 per year. By contrast,
in China it averaged $1.50 and in India $2.11
Over the same time period, the compounded
average annual GDP growth rate per capita
in China was 7.9 percent and in India 3.5 per-
cent. In Africa it was a negative 0.16 percent
(see Figure 5).12
The importance of growth cannot be over-
emphasized. There is not a single example of a
country emerging from widespread poverty
without sustained economic growth. As Uni-
versity of Oxford professor Paul Collier writes,
“Growth is not a cure-all, but lack of growth is a
kill-all.”13 Growth cannot solve all problems in
the developing world, but without growth there
can be no lasting solution to the challenges
faced by developing countries. 
Thus, Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen
of the World Bank write, between 1981 and
2005, the number of people with an income
below $1.25 per day in China declined from 84
percent to 15.9 percent, reducing the absolute
number of poor from 835.1 million to 207.7
million. In India, poverty declined from 59.8
percent to 41.6 percent. (Because of popula-
tion growth, however, the number of poor rose
from 420.5 million to 455.8 million.) In Africa,
the poverty rate declined slightly from 53.7
percent to 51.2 percent. As in India, popula-
tion growth increased the absolute number of
poor from 213.7 million to 390.6 million.14
The failure of foreign aid to improve
growth rates in Africa has not stood in the way
of those who want to see more of it.15 In 2005,
for example, Columbia University professor
Jeffrey Sachs unveiled his plan to end extreme
poverty around the world by 2025. Rich coun-
tries, Sachs argued, should commit themselves
to increasing annual aid to the world’s poorest
nations from $74 billion in 2006 to $135 bil-
lion in 2015.16 Also in 2005, the Commission
for Africa called for doubling aid to Africa to
$50 billion by 2010 and tripling it to $75 bil-
lion by 2015.17 In the end, the G8 committed
itself to doubling aid to Africa to $50 billion
per year.
Is There Need for Aid?
In the 1950s and 1960s, many development
economists believed in the “vicious cycle of
poverty” theory, which argued that poverty in
the developing world prevented the accumula-
tion of domestic savings (i.e., people in poor
countries consumed all of their income and had
nothing left to save and invest). Low savings
resulted in low domestic investment, and low
investment was seen as the main impediment to
rapid economic growth. Foreign aid, therefore,
was intended to fill the apparent gap between
insufficient savings and the requisite investment
in the economy. Today’s calls for more foreign
aid are based largely on the same theory.18
Yet experience contradicts the “vicious
cycle of poverty” theory. Today, many former-
6
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ly poor countries enjoy high standards of liv-
ing, while others have stagnated or, in some
cases, regressed. For example, the 1960 per
capita income in South Korea was $1,226. In
Ghana it was $1,378. By 2003 South Korea
had reached $15,732, while Ghana had fallen
to $1,360.19 As New York University professor
William Easterly writes, “It doesn’t help the
poverty trap story that 11 out of the 28 poor-
est countries in 1985 had not been in the
poorest fifth back in 1950. They had gotten
into poverty by declining from above, rather
than being stuck in it from below, while oth-
ers escaped. If the identity of who is in the
poverty trap keeps changing, it must not be
much of a trap.”20
Countries that improve their policies and
institutions—by increasing their trade open-
ness, limiting state intervention in the econo-
my, building a business-friendly environment,
and emphasizing protection of property rights
and the rule of law—tend to grow faster than
others.21 Such countries also tend to attract for-
eign capital, which can help to increase eco-
nomic growth.22 Improvement in policies and
institutions also creates a suitable environment
for growth in domestic investment. As trust in
institutions such as the rule of law and protec-
tion of private property grows, people feel more
confident investing in the local economy.23
Today, the size and the scope of global cap-
ital markets make Africa’s access to capital
7
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Figure 5
Average Annual per Capita Aid and Growth Rate in China, India, and Africa, 1975–2005
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators Online,” http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI.
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potentially easier than at any time in the past.
Indeed, private capital flows to developing
countries now dwarfs aid flows. According to
Adam Lerrick of the American Enterprise
Institute, “The development banks now sup-
ply a mere 2 percent of the average net [capital
worth] $200 billion that the capital markets
provide.”24
The Impact of Aid on Economic Reforms
in Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the least economi-
cally free region in the world.25 There is a gen-
eral consensus among economists that Africa
needs to catch up with the rest of the world in
terms of economic liberalization. Aid is often
intended to promote policy reform, yet it has
helped to create disincentives to liberaliza-
tion for a number of reasons. 
For example, aid is often driven by foreign
policy considerations, not economics. For much
of the Cold War, African countries were given
bilateral and multilateral assistance on the basis
of their geopolitical importance to the West and
the Soviet Union. As recent American aid to
Ethiopia and Chinese aid to Sudan show, geo-
political interests continue to influence aid deci-
sions today.
Aid has not led to economic reforms in
Africa.26 In the 1980s, the World Bank started
to promote structural adjustment loans that
were meant to disburse aid to countries in
exchange for their commitment to economic
reforms.27 Such conditional lending soon
proved ineffective, in part because aid agencies
have no enforcement mechanism, and also
because they have a well-known bureaucratic
incentive to lend, which undermines the cred-
ibility of their conditionality.28
In fact, aid may also actively retard policy
reform. Between 1970 and 1993, for example,
the World Bank and the IMF gave Zambia 18
adjustment loans with little or no reforms tak-
ing place, forcing World Bank researchers to
conclude that “this large amount of assistance
sustained a poor policy regime.”29More gener-
ally, two World Bank researchers concluded
that “higher aid slowed reform [in the devel-
oping world] over the 1980–2000 period.”30
Even in those countries that follow sensible
macroeconomic policies, aid appears to have no
positive effect and may go so far as to discour-
age reform. Some World Bank research claimed
that developing countries that follow good fis-
cal, monetary, and trade policies benefit from
foreign aid. But that research has been difficult
to independently corroborate. Scholars who
used updated World Bank data found no posi-
tive correlation between foreign aid and eco-
nomic growth in countries with “good poli-
cies.”31 Research suggests that when govern-
ments do decide to undertake economic
reforms, they tend to do so because of domestic
factors, including economic crises.32
Problems with Aid Delivery 
Most major economies have an independent
aid agency. Sometimes, countries give aid on
different levels. The European Union, for exam-
ple, gives aid through the European Commis-
sioner for Development and Humanitarian
Aid. So do many EU member states, including
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Ireland, Holland and Sweden.
Moreover, the Europeans have a strong voice on
the governing boards of the World Bank and
IMF. In addition to those official agencies, there
has been a massive increase in the number of
aid-promoting non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs).33 But effective and efficient deliv-
ery of aid has, so far, proved to be an insur-
mountable challenge.
The “aid industry” provides employment for
many thousands of people.34 Consequently, a
large percentage of the money spent on foreign
aid goes to cover overhead costs, including
administration, travel, accommodation, etc.35
Michael Maren, a former aid worker, writes that
the money spent on aid bureaucracies creates
perverse incentives. “We have to take advantage
of this famine to expand our regular program,”
argued one aid official that Maren encountered
in Africa. She saw hunger and poverty as “a
growth opportunity.” “Whatever the original
intentions,” Maren notes, “aid programs had
become an end in themselves.”36
Moreover, dealing with a multitude of
donors and aid agencies, all of whom require
8
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362963_DPA9_1stClass:362963_DPA9_1stClass  4/27/2009  7:10 AM  Page 8
some degree of attention, puts an enormous
strain on African bureaucracies. The time and
effort spent on dealing with the needs of the
foreign donors rather than dealing with the
needs of the populace has further distanced
African governments from their electorates.37
The multitude of donors sometimes also
results in “duplication” of their efforts. USAID,
for example, has “produced a report on corrup-
tion in Uganda in 2001, unaware that British
analysts had produced a report on the same
topic six months earlier.” Similarly, in the early
1990s, “Tanzania was implementing 15 sepa-
rate stand-alone health sector projects funded
by 15 different donors.”38
Moreover, many foreign donors have their
own agendas that may be detrimental to the
welfare of the African people. Like the 19th-cen-
tury European missionaries who went to Africa
to spread their vision of a “good life,” modern
day aid missionaries have found in Africa a fer-
tile ground for social experiments that would
never be accepted in their home countries.
Tanzania, for example, is still recovering from
an attempt to centrally plan the economy, the
so-called “Ujaama” policy of collectivization
that was bankrolled to the tune of $10 billion
by the socialist governments in Scandinavian
countries in the 1970s and 1980s.39
Research suggests that aid also increases
government spending in the recipient coun-
tries.40 In many cases, much of the additional
spending ends up in the pockets of government
bureaucrats instead of reaching the intended
beneficiaries. Between 1991 and 1995, for ex-
ample, schools in Uganda received only 13 per-
cent of the school grants that Uganda was giv-
en by the donor community.41
Aid encourages rent-seeking in recipient
countries. Special interest groups and individ-
uals focus their efforts not on being produc-
tive, but on lobbying government officials in
order to get access to aid. In that way, aid
reduces potential economic output and en-
courages corruption and political conflict.42
Moreover, by transferring resources to
favored projects of government officials, com-
petition among domestic producers is under-
mined. As a result of government favoritism,
parts of the domestic consumer base may
become captive to firms that provide shoddy
and expensive goods and services. Similarly,
aid can undermine the international competi-
tiveness of African exports by artificially
strengthening the local currency.43
Finally, the aid community lacks account-
ability and feedback. Very few aid agencies and
virtually no individuals are directly responsible
for specific outcomes. Independent evalua-
tions of the effectiveness of donor efforts to
alleviate poverty or to arrest the spread of dis-
ease, for example, are very rare. Moreover, the
donors often determine what they will supply
without much regard for what is actually need-
ed. This top-down approach has most spectac-
ularly failed to alleviate poverty in Africa where
government accountability is weak and institu-
tional deficiencies extensive.44
Aid Undermines Democracy
Many people, including former UN secre-
tary general Kofi Annan, have argued that aid
is needed in order to promote democracy.45
Stephen Knack of the World Bank, however,
found no evidence that aid promoted democ-
racy between 1975 and 2000.46 (In fact, the aid
agencies have repeatedly bankrolled some of
the world’s most unsavory regimes.47) Other
research goes further, suggesting that aid may
hurt democratic development in developing
countries.48 That may be the case for several
reasons.
Aid helps to undermine democratic ac-
countability in Africa, because African gov-
ernments find themselves increasingly an-
swerable to the donors, not to the public.
Government spending proposals, for exam-
ple, allocate funds in accordance with the
advice of foreign experts rather than the
wishes of the electorate.49
Aid encourages military spending. Since aid
is fungible, it helps some recipient governments
free up resources for military purchases that
would otherwise be spent on roads and educa-
tion, for example. Consider the World Bank’s
recent contribution of $180 million toward the
building of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline.
Fearing that the oil revenue would be misspent,
9
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the World Bank got the Chadian government
to commit to spending it on education, health,
and infrastructure. What was the result? “The
first $4.5 million received as a signing bonus
from the oil companies was used to buy
weapons—and it is estimated that as much as
$12 million may be diverted to buy arms.”50
In fact, Paul Collier found that “some-
thing around 40 percent of Africa’s military
spending is inadvertently financed by aid.”51
Aid may also fuel armed competition for
resources. There is some evidence, for exam-
ple, that Somalia’s civil war was prolonged by
the competition between different factions
for large amounts of food aid that the coun-
try was receiving.52
A growing number of Africans question the
effects of foreign aid on economic growth and
democracy in Africa. President Paul Kagame of
Rwanda, for example, has recently urged
Africans “to be honest about the consequences
of aid dependence,” for “what really matters
most for socio-economic transformation is pri-
vate capital.”53 He has called on African gov-
ernments to create policy environments in
which entrepreneurs can flourish. Others, like
Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda, point to
the negative political impact of aid. According
to Mwenda, “foreign aid . . . is providing the
government with an independent source of
‘unearned’ revenue. That allows the govern-
ment to avoid accountability to Uganda’s citi-
zens.”54 Unfortunately, when Mwenda spoke
out against further aid at the 2007 Technology,
Entertainment, Design conference (TED), the
enraged Irish musician Bono heckled Mwenda
with shouts of “Bollocks!” and “That’s bull-
shit.”55 In view of growing evidence that aid has
failed to deliver growth and democracy to
Africa, Western donors should reevaluate their
commitment to further disbursements of aid
to the continent. 
Debt Relief: 
A Recurrent Problem
Most African debt to the rest of the world
is in the form of public debt that African gov-
ernments owe to other governments, multi-
lateral organizations such as the World Bank
and IMF, or debt that is otherwise guaran-
teed by African governments. In 2007,
Africa’s long-term debt stood at $146 billion,
of which $126 billion or 86 percent was pub-
lic or publicly guaranteed debt (see Figure 6).
The high level of debt, widely considered
to be unsustainable, shows that aid failed in
its primary task. Instead of generating eco-
nomic growth, aid was poorly used and often
wasted on white elephant projects or stolen
by Africa’s corrupt political elites.56
Still, African politicians are not the only
ones deserving blame. As the prime minister
of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad, said
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, “for
every bad borrower there is a bad lender.”57
Through their actions, the World Bank, the
IMF, and other official donors have helped
corrupt and inept regimes that engaged in
gross economic mismanagement. 
Were it not for official lenders, borrower
governments would seek loans under market
conditions. Lenders would lend to govern-
ments at rates reflecting the risk involved. The
more incompetent governments would be
forced to borrow at higher interest rates.
Lending by the World Bank and IMF often
achieves the opposite. Those institutions pro-
vide concessional loans to the poorest coun-
tries and charge those clients uniform interest
rates regardless of differences in the policy
environments or other factors bearing on the
ability of the borrowing governments to
repay.
In response to the mess that they helped
to create, the World Bank and IMF began to
provide debt relief to low-income developing
countries, the vast majority of them in Africa,
in 1996. The Debt Relief Initiative for Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries was followed by the
enhanced HIPC initiative in 1999 and then
by the creation of the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative in 2005. By October 2008, “debt
reduction packages have been approved for
33 countries, 27 of them in Africa, providing
US$51 billion (in end-2007 net present value
terms) in debt-service relief over time.58
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Rationalizations behind the Debt Relief
The debt relief was preceded by a global
campaign spearheaded by Jubilee 2000, a
British NGO, which called for cancellation of
poor countries’ debts because “they are unjust
in terms of their origin, as well as because they
worsen poverty.”59 Other organizations have
echoed that call. Oxfam, for example, stated
that “For the world’s poorest countries to
divert vitally needed resources to rich creditors
rather than to spending on the health or edu-
cation of their citizens is both immoral and
economically irrational.”60
Indeed, African history after independence
is peppered with examples of despotic rulers
who acquired massive debts but did not bene-
fit their respective populations in any mean-
ingful way.61 But contrary to Oxfam, there is
no automatic link between debt relief and
increased spending on public services and
poverty reduction.62 In fact, the well-inten-
tioned advocates of debt relief have been
sometimes taken for a ride by cynical politi-
cians who call for debt relief even as they con-
tribute to wasteful spending and debt accu-
mulation.
Consider the former Tanzanian president
Benjamin Mkapa—a member of Tony Blair’s
Commission for Africa, who, in addition to
the tripling of aid to Africa, also called for a
“100 percent cancellation of all debt service
for all HIPCs and other severely indebted
low-income countries.” Mkapa was appoint-
ed to the Commission in spite of his 2002
purchase of a $30 million personal jet—his
second. A few months earlier, his government
infuriated the World Bank by spending $56
million, fully one-third of Tanzania’s educa-
tion budget, on a military air traffic control
system that was to keep track of that coun-
try’s “19 combat aircraft in various states of
repair and four unarmed helicopters.”63
Nor is it likely that the debt relief will allevi-
ate African poverty. Adam Lerrick of Carnegie
Mellon University notes, “Contrary to the
plaintive appeals of the NGOs, real debt for-
11
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Figure 6
African Public Debt Relative to Long-Term Debt, 1970 to 2007
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators Online,” http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI.
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giveness was granted without fanfare and mul-
tilateral resources were irreversibly lost long
ago. For decades, not a single African farmer
has labored to pay off a burdensome debt. And
for decades, the multilateral agencies have
played a shell game with what they privately
acknowledged were worthless developing
nation loans by recirculating funding on fanta-
sy balance sheets.”64
Put differently, the World Bank and IMF
recognized a long time ago that much of
Africa’s debt was uncollectable. And so they
engaged in so-called “defensive lending,” dis-
bursing “new” loans to match “repayment” of
old loans—thus perpetually rolling over debt
that African and other HIPC countries, in prac-
tice, had already defaulted on (see Figure 7).
In addition to failing to meet its stated
objectives, debt relief may have negative unin-
tended consequences. Debt relief creates
“moral hazard,” in the sense that it penalizes
countries that have practiced fiscal prudence
and rewards countries that have engaged in
fiscal imprudence. It may thus encourage bad
behavior or fiscal imprudence in the future. As
Lerrick put it, “if you forgive the debt of coun-
tries that have accumulated unsustainable
debt burdens, you are favoring them com-
pared to countries that have followed prudent
policies and have not accumulated unsustain-
able debt burdens.”65
HIPC and MDRI: Self-Serving Initiatives
Why did the World Bank and IMF resort to
accounting tricks to deal with bad African
debt? Part of the reason is the reputation that
the two institutions enjoy, which, they boast,
was never marred by a loss, a restructuring, or
a write-off.66 Moreover, explicit admission of
failure with respect to lending to the world’s
poorest countries, most of them in Africa,
would raise serious questions about the roles
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Figure 7
Defensive Lending by the World Bank and IMF to HIPC Countries, 1985–2003
Source: Adam Lerrick, “The Debt of the Poorest Nations: A Gold Mine for Development Aid,” International Economics
Report, Carnegie Mellon University Gailliot Center for Public Policy, June 2005, p. 8.
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that the World Bank and IMF have played in
the developing world over the last few decades. 
Through the various debt relief initiatives,
the World Bank and IMF succeeded in per-
suading developed countries to assume much
of the bad debts of African states. Thus, over
the next 40 years or so, American and Euro-
pean taxpayers will pay down Africa’s bad
debts by refilling the coffers of the World Bank
and IMF, leaving both the reputation and the
account books of the two international finan-
cial institutions in seemingly pristine shape.67
As a result of the developed world’s com-
mitment to take on Africa’s debt burden and to
replenish the World Bank’s and IMF’s coffers,
the two institutions will now have more mon-
ey to spend on aid disbursements. In the ab-
sence of meaningful political and economic
reforms in Africa, the new aid is likely to lead to
more debt in the future. That has happened be-
fore. Between 1989 and 1997, the HIPC coun-
tries received some $33 billion in debt relief.68
Yet many HIPC countries kept on borrowing—
with some of them ending up in deeper debt
after the debt relief than before.
Ethiopia: A Case Study
Ethiopia has been a major recipient of for-
eign aid over the last six decades. Between 1950
and 2007, the country received 111 grants from
the World Bank totaling $5.4 billion. In 2008,
there were 28 active World Bank projects in
Ethiopia worth $2.7 billion.69 In addition to the
aid disbursed by the World Bank, Ethiopia has
received much aid from bilateral donors. U.S.
government assistance, for example, amounted
to $2.3 billion between 1991 and 2003.70 Other
aid poured in from European countries as well
as the former Soviet bloc. 
By 1998, Ethiopia’s total external debt stood
at $9.6 billion, or 124 percent of the nation’s
GDP. One hundred percent of Ethiopia’s long-
term debt was (and remains) public debt owed
to foreign governments and international
financial institutions.71 That May, a territorial
war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The conflict lasted for two years and cost the
lives of some 70,000 people; up to 50,000 of the
dead combatants were Ethiopians.72
The objective of the war was to capture
Badme, a small town with a population of
about 1,500 people on the border between the
two countries.73 According to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, the Ethiopian
government spent $467 million on its military
in 1999 and Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian prime
minister, admitted that the war cost Ethiopia
$1 million a day.74 The annual per capita in-
come in Ethiopia stood at $119 in 1999.75
Remarkably, six months after the outbreak
of the Badme conflict, the IMF and the World
Bank, sighting much progress in Ethiopia,
agreed that the country should be eligible for
debt reduction under the HIPC initiative.76 A
year later, Russia wrote off $4 billion of
Ethiopian debt.77 But by 2001, Ethiopian debt
was on an upward trajectory again. Then, in
2004, Ethiopia finally started receiving $1.3
billion in HIPC debt relief.78
The year 2005 marked the tenth anniversary
of Meles Zenawi’s election as Ethiopia’s prime
minister. Zenawi’s rule started in a promising
way. When he met with the regional leaders in
Kampala, Uganda, during his African trip in
1998, U.S. president Bill Clinton called the Ethi-
opian prime minister one of Africa’s “new gen-
eration” of leaders.79 Clinton’s implication was
that the “new generation” of African leaders
would stay clear of the corruption and despo-
tism that marked many regimes in post-inde-
pendence Africa. As an acknowledgement of his
status as one of Africa’s great and good, Zenawi
was asked to be a member of Tony Blair’s Com-
mission on Africa in 2004. 
In May 2005, some two months after Blair’s
commission published its findings, Zenawi
presided over rigged parliamentary and regional
elections. On the eve of the elections, with early
returns predicting a clear victory for the opposi-
tion Coalition for Unity and Democracy and
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces, Zenawi
went on national television and declared a state
of emergency. With final results unannounced
for three weeks after the polls and amidst
reports of massive fraud, the Ethiopian opposi-
tion took to the streets. In the days that fol-
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lowed, 193 protesters were shot dead and 763
were wounded in Addis Ababa alone. Some
50,000 people were imprisoned, including many
of the leaders of the opposition.80
As Michela Wrong, former Africa corre-
spondent for the BBC and Financial Times,
wrote at the time, “In the Ethiopian capital, a
regime that has been hailed by Tony Blair as
an example of progressive African govern-
ment has shot women and children in the
streets, detained thousands, and rounded up
the opposition leaders who accuse it, with
ample justification, of rigging elections in
May. Embarrassingly, the forces involved in
these abuses were trained by British police
officers, at British taxpayers’ expense.”81
Following the 2005 crackdown, the World
Bank suspended new loans to the Zenawi gov-
ernment—for awhile. A mere 12 months later,
the World Bank was lending again. To silence
those critical voices who argued against aid
disbursements to African dictators, the World
Bank claimed that instead of directly support-
ing the federal budget, it would merely finance
“the delivery of basic services to the popula-
tion through grants to local governments.”82
In practical terms, of course, there is little sub-
stantive difference between funding of the
nine local governments and subsidizing the
federal budget that financed the local govern-
ments in the first place. Indeed, the aid money
frees up resources for the federal budget.
The World Bank’s lending amounted to 9
percent of the federal budget in 2008, though
in 2005 it amounted to as much as 15 per-
cent.83 In addition to benefiting from aid dis-
bursed by the World Bank and a consortium
of European countries, Zenawi has also
gained from the financial and political back-
ing that the Ethiopian government received
from the Bush administration as America’s
valued friend in the war on terror.84
Berhanu Nega, the deputy chairman of the
Coalition for Unity and Democracy who was
elected mayor of Addis Ababa in the 2005 elec-
tions, but who was subsequently jailed for
almost two years, believes that without foreign
aid, the Zenawi government would not be able
to survive for long. What is more, without for-
eign aid, Zenawi would find himself without an
important source of foreign exchange that has
enabled the Ethiopian government to arm its
police and military. In the meantime, Nega con-
tends, foreign aid has helped to facilitate politi-
cal repression in Ethiopia and undermine
democratic evolution in the country. Since
Zenawi has closed off all avenues of dissent, an
increasing number of Ethiopians have been tak-
ing up arms against the government. Currently,
there are civil conflicts of varying intensity in
eight out of nine Ethiopian provinces.85
Political repression aside, Ethiopia has not
made much economic progress either. In
2007, for example, the World Bank acknowl-
edged that “the past 15 years witnessed stabil-
ity, significant expansion in schooling, health
services, roads and other services—from an
extraordinarily low base.” “Nevertheless,” the
Bank was forced to admit, “there has been lit-
tle overall growth in productivity. Lack of pro-
ductivity growth was a particular disappoint-
ment in the agricultural sector, which still
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Table 1
Ethiopia’s Long-Term Debt and Foreign Aid, 1997–2006 (current US$ in billions)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Long Term Debt 9.4 9.6 5.4 5.3 5.6 6.3 7 6.3 5.9 2.2
Foreign Aid 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.9 2
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators Online,” http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI. 
Note: Foreign aid consists of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid. For definitions of Official Develop-
ment Assistance and Official Aid see http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,fr_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html
#1965580.
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accounts for 85 percent of employment, and
forms the centre of the Government’s develop-
ment strategy. Primarily because of this, in-
come poverty has failed to show significant
declines over time.”86
As ever, the World Bank’s and IMF’s answer
to the political and economic situation in
Ethiopia was more aid and more debt relief.
Thus, when Ethiopia became eligible for debt
relief under the terms of the G8’s Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative in 2006, her debt was
slashed by an additional $2.3 billion.87
Predictably, Ethiopia’s representative at the
United Nations said that the most recent round
of debt reductions “was not enough to make
significant inroads towards attaining the
Millennium Development Goals.” (Ostensibly,
the MDRI debt relief is supposed to help facili-
tate the fulfillment of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals in the world’s poorest countries.)
“Ethiopia,” he claimed, will make “more prog-
ress towards achieving the Goals if more
resources had been made available through the
international development cooperation frame-
work.” Put differently, debt reduction to
Ethiopia should be accompanied by more aid.88
All indications are that the donor community
will, once again, oblige the aid requests from
Addis Ababa despite the fact that foreign aid to
Ethiopia has already risen from $643 million in
1999 to $2 billion in 2006—a nominal increase
of 211 percent.
Aid and debt relief have been largely
divorced from economic and political reforms
in Ethiopia over the last decade. If anything,
they seemed to have followed serious trans-
gressions on the part of the Ethiopian ruling
elite. Today, Ethiopian debt is down to the lev-
els last seen in the early 1980s, while aid is
reaching historical highs.
Trade Liberalization:
A Key to Development
The G8 has agreed to a three-pronged ap-
proach that is supposed to help Africa escape
poverty. Increased aid and debt relief will be of
limited benefit and may prove to have deleteri-
ous consequences for economic growth. But
trade liberalization could prove to be a stimulus
for African economies. That is why a successful
conclusion of the Doha round of negotiations
on trade liberalization was an integral part of
the G8’s plan for Africa. That is also why the
destructive role that the African delegates
played in Doha’s collapse was so self-defeating. 
The Benefits of Trade Liberalization
The theoretical benefits of trade are well
known. Trade improves global efficiency in
resource allocation or, to put it differently, it
provides a superior way of delivering goods
and services to those who value them most.
An expanded market allows traders to gain
from specializing in the production of those
goods and services that they do best (i.e., the
law of comparative advantage). Trade allows
consumers to benefit from more-efficient
methods of production. Without large mar-
kets for goods and services, it would not be
economical to separate production into spe-
cific operations and plan large production
runs. Large production runs, in turn, are in-
strumental to reducing the cost of a product.
The reduction of the cost of production leads
to cheaper goods and services, which increas-
es the real standard of living.
But what does research say about actual ben-
efits to Africa from trade liberalization? In a
much-cited 2005 paper, World Bank research-
ers estimated African benefits from trade liber-
alization. According to the World Bank, “The
results suggest moving to free global merchan-
dise trade would boost real incomes in Sub-
Saharan Africa proportionately more than in
other developing countries or in high-income
countries, despite a terms of trade loss in parts
of the region. Farm employment and output,
the real value of agricultural and food exports,
the real returns to farm land and unskilled
labor, and real net farm incomes would all rise
in the region, thereby alleviating poverty.”89
In real terms, annual welfare in Africa
would be $4.8 billion greater in 2015 than
would be the case had no liberalization taken
place.90 There would be growth in agricultur-
al incomes and in employment.91 Moreover,
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Africa stands to gain much from internal
trade liberalization. Denis Medvedev of the
World Bank has estimated that by 2015,
annual welfare gains from intra-African trade
liberalization would amount to 36 percent of
all the welfare gains that Africa stands to
receive from global trade liberalization.92
Developed Countries Need to End Their
Protectionist Policies 
The case against developed world protec-
tionism against products from developing
countries, including Africa, is well known.
Seventy-three percent of poor people in devel-
oping countries live in rural areas and 60 per-
cent of the labor force in low-income countries
derives its income from agriculture. Agricul-
ture and agro-related services generate 25 per-
cent of low-income countries’ GDP.93
Yet, the developed world’s protection a-
gainst the developing world’s agricultural
exports is four to seven times higher than that
on the developing world’s manufacturing
exports.94Many agricultural goods from Africa
and other developing countries face tariff esca-
lation.95 Tariffs of up to 500 percent are some-
times applied by the United States, European
Union, Japan, and Canada on products that
include beef, dairy products, vegetables, fresh
fruit, cereals, sugar, prepared fruit and vegeta-
bles, wine, spirits, and tobacco.96
Rich countries’ support for agriculture
undercuts competition from cheaper products
originating in the developing world.97 In 2007,
agricultural support in the countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development came to about $365 billion.98
Agricultural subsidies in rich countries also
cause overproduction of certain farm products.
That agricultural surplus is often dumped on
the world markets, which depresses prices and
undermines farmers in poor countries.99 Agri-
cultural dumping is an especially serious prob-
lem for many developing countries, where agri-
cultural production enjoys a comparative
advantage over the developed world. The Euro-
pean Union’s Common Agricultural Policy
alone is estimated to cause $20 billion worth of
annual losses in poor countries.100
In short, because agriculture is such an im-
portant part of developing countries’ econo-
mies, and because it receives extensive protection
in developed countries, such protectionism
undermines markets and makes the developed
world’s proclamations in favor of free trade
sound hollow and hypocritical. 
Africa Is One of the World’s Most
Protectionist Regions
Unfortunately, when it comes to trade pro-
tectionism, Africa is far from blameless. In fact,
Africa is one of the world’s most protectionist
regions. Average applied tariff rates in Africa,
for example, remain comparatively high.101
Whereas average applied tariffs in high-income
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development countries fell from 9.5 percent to
2.9 percent between 1988 and 2007 (a 70 per-
cent reduction), average applied tariffs in Africa
only fell from 26.6 percent to 13.1 percent
between 1987 and 2007 (a 50 percent reduc-
tion).102
In addition to tariffs, there is a plethora of
nontariff barriers to trade that African coun-
tries employ.103 According to the Commission
for Africa, “the costs and difficulty of moving
goods across, between, in and out of some
African countries can be far higher than in
richer countries, undermining Africa’s com-
petitiveness. . . . In the 1990s, it cost about the
same to clear a 20-foot container through
ports of Abidjan or Dakar as it did to ship the
same container all the way to a north-Euro-
pean port. Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from
the highest average customs delays in the
world: for example, Estonia and Lithuania
require only one day for customs clearance—
versus 30 days on average for Ethiopia.”104
African countries also impose significantly
higher tariffs on one another than rich coun-
tries impose on Africa. The World Bank data
show that African countries levy an average
applied tariff of 34 percent on agricultural
exports from other African countries. Industrial
countries, by contrast, levy an average applied
tariff of 24 percent on African agricultural
exports. Similarly, African countries maintain
an average applied tariff of 21 percent on non-
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agricultural exports from other African coun-
tries. Industrial countries maintain an average
applied tariff of 4 percent on African non-agri-
cultural exports.105
Not surprisingly, African intraregional trade
covered only 10 percent of African exports.106 In
contrast, 68 percent of exports from countries
in Western Europe were exported to other
Western European countries. Similarly, 40 per-
cent of North American exports were to other
countries in North America.107
The Failure of Doha
At the conclusion of the Gleneagles sum-
mit, Tony Blair described the successful con-
clusion of the Doha Round of negotiations
on trade as “a necessary element of our [G8]
work to reduce global poverty.”108 The nego-
tiations launched in Qatar in 2001 were
dubbed the “Doha Development Agenda,” so
as to highlight that the greatest beneficiaries
of future trade liberalization would be devel-
oping countries, including African countries.
Unfortunately, Doha became the first round
of negotiations on trade liberalization in the
post–World War II era that ended in failure. 
Many countries deserve blame for the fail-
ure of the Doha round. The Europeans failed
to agree to deeper cuts in agricultural tariffs.
Americans failed to agree to real cuts in farm
subsidies. The Indians and the Brazilians
failed to move sufficiently on liberalization of
their manufacturing sectors. But one of the
most destructive and certainly the most self-
defeating roles in bringing about the collapse
of negotiations was played by the African del-
egates. 
The Doha round of negotiations on trade
liberalization ran into trouble during the
2003 ministerial meeting in Cancun. Egged
on by Oxfam, African and other developing
countries demanded that they be exempted
from further commitments to trade liberal-
ization.109 As far as the African countries were
concerned, trade liberalization was a one-way
street: the developed world would open its
markets to African goods, while Africa would
continue to shut goods made in the devel-
oped world out of African markets. 
Economic theory and empirical evidence
shows that there is much wisdom in unilateral
liberalization, and developing countries gain
enormously from opening their markets to for-
eign imports irrespective of what other coun-
tries do. But unilateral liberalization was not
on the table in Cancun. Global negotiations on
trade liberalization happen along long-estab-
lished mercantilist lines, where countries trade
“concessions” on “market access” with one
another. 
At the heart of this mercantilist view of trade
is a deep misunderstanding of the role that for-
eign competition plays in stimulating domestic
production. Mercantilists see imports as a
threat, which is why, at Cancun, African trade
ministers emphasized exports and access to
developed world markets, as opposed to open-
ing their own countries to foreign goods. In
reality, imports increase competition and spe-
cialization, and increased specialization leads to
increased productivity. In a competitive market,
reduction of the cost of production then leads
to cheaper goods and services, which in turn
increases the real standard of living. That is a
major reason why people living in more open
economies tend to be richer.
The Cancun meeting collapsed around a
minor issue of trade facilitation. The refusal
of developing countries, including African
states, to negotiate about the streamlining of
the paperwork needed to clear imports at the
border convinced the Mexican chairman of
the conference that there was no point in dis-
cussing the much more contentious issue of
tariff reductions. With the battle lines drawn
at Cancun, all sides were determined to hold
out for the best possible deal—which was
supposed to be struck at the next ministerial
meeting in Hong Kong in December of 2005.
But that deal was never struck, as the meeting
in Hong Kong made little headway. 
Doha’s failure is a tragedy for Africa. Trade
liberalization is, after all, most advantageous to
the most protectionist countries and Africa
remains one of the most protectionist regions
in the world. True, Africans were never going to
get everything that they wanted. It is also true
that the Doha round exposed the basic hy-
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pocrisy of the developed countries that preach
free trade, but continue to insist on protecting
the “sensitive” sectors of their economies, like
agriculture. 
Reaching an agreement would have been a
step in the right direction. Not only would it
allow Africans greater access to developed
world markets than they currently enjoy, but
it would also allow Africans to “lock in” those
new market access “gains” without the fear of
backsliding by some WTO member states.
Similarly, it would lock in Africa’s own com-
mitments, making a return to protectionism
more difficult. Importantly, it would allow
the African states to use the WTO adjudica-
tion mechanisms to hold other member
states, including other African countries, true
to their trade liberalization commitments.
The WTO’s dispute resolution process has
already proven to be a very effective mecha-
nism for small developing countries to force
change in the trade policies of large devel-
oped nations. The above considerations are
especially important now that the world
economy has entered a slowdown and fears
of protectionism abound.110
Trade Liberalization Is Not Enough
Trade liberalization is necessary, but not
sufficient, for economic development. As
Arvind Panagariya of Columbia University
observes, “There are complementary condi-
tions [to trade openness] such as macroeco-
nomic stability, credibility of policy and
enforcement of contracts without which the
benefits of openness may fail to material-
ize.”111 Similarly, membership in the WTO
does not automatically lead to prosperity.
According to Alan Oxley, the former head of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the WTO “is a self-help organization. It lays
down rules; it is up to members to work with-
in them if they want increases in trade and
growth.”112
How can Africa maximize the benefits from
future trade liberalization? The Commission
for Africa put it best when it argued that a
“major problem [that] Africa faces is its weak
capacity to trade—driven by its low productivity
and poor competitiveness.”113 Put differently, in
addition to greater market access, Africa needs
to expand the portfolio of goods and services
that the rest of the world may wish to buy. In
order to achieve that, African countries will have
to undertake major policy changes. Among
other reforms, 
•Africa has to improve the stability and
integrity of its legal systems. Without a
functioning court system, investors cannot
be sure their contracts will be enforced. For
example, Africa has few lawyers, many of
whom are subject to bribes and intimida-
tion by the political elite.114
•Africa has to tackle the problem of poor
governance, inefficient bureaucracies, and
corruption. African governments tend to
be unaccountable to the people over
whom they rule. Instead, they often func-
tion in order to further the objectives of
the political elites.115 The constitutional
structures, legal systems, and civil societies
are not strong enough to insist on the
transparency of the budgetary process,
which leads to corruption and embezzle-
ment by government officials.116
• Africa has to reduce the regulatory bur-
den that stifles private sector growth.
The World Bank’s Doing Business reports
show that improvement in the regulato-
ry environment, including cutting of red
tape, can result in significantly greater
private sector investment and lead to
higher economic growth.117
•Africa suffers from a lack of good infra-
structure, with dilapidated roads, railways,
ports, and airports increasing transport
costs and reducing economic activity.118
Fixing Africa’s infrastructure is a massive
task that will take much money and many
years to complete, but privatization of in-
efficient government monopolies, includ-
ing ports and railways, can be done rela-
tively easily.
•Africa has to address the lack of regional
economic integration. Regional trade in
Africa is significantly smaller as a percent-
age of African exports than is the case in,
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for example, Western Europe and North
America.119 Unfortunately, many regional
free-trade initiatives remain little more
than ambitious commitments.120
Despite the collapse of the Doha round, free
trade (combined with domestic policy reforms)
remains the most effective way for Africa to
escape poverty. African countries should not
wait for other countries to move ahead with
liberalization. It is, therefore, encouraging to
see some African politicians call for more trade
liberalization. South African finance minister
Trevor Manuel, for example, has “called for a
return to the aggressive approach to trade lib-
eralization of the 1990s, urging that South
Africa buck the slow pace of multilateral trade
negotiations and introduce unilateral trade
reforms to boost growth.”121
Conclusion
Before the United Nations’ Earth Summit
that took place in Johannesburg in August
2002, the former South African president
Thabo Mbeki called on the rich countries to
end what he called a system of “global apart-
heid.” As Mbeki said, “A global human society
based on poverty for many and prosperity for a
few, characterized by islands of wealth, sur-
rounded by a sea of poverty, is unsustain-
able.”122
Mbeki was wide off the mark. As more
countries and regions grow prosperous,
absolute poverty is increasingly an African,
rather than a global, problem. The extent of
the problem has, understandably, caught the
attention of many well-meaning people
around the world. Partly in response to pub-
lic pressure, the G8 countries have commit-
ted vast resources in an attempt to alleviate
African suffering.
Unfortunately, two out of three initiatives
that the G8 agreed to at Gleneagles—more
foreign aid and debt relief—are approaches
that have not succeeded in spurring African
growth or alleviating the continent’s poverty.
They are unlikely to succeed in the future.
The third initiative—greater trade liberaliza-
tion—has failed along with the Doha round
of negotiations on trade. Along with ending
agricultural protectionism and subsidies,
politicians, movie stars, and other celebrities
should promote the cause of trade liberaliza-
tion, which has a proven record of stimulat-
ing growth. 
Lastly, well-meaning people in the West
must recognize that most African problems
cannot be solved in Western capitals. African
poverty is primarily caused by flawed domes-
tic policies and institutions. As such, poverty
can only be overcome by changes made by
Africans themselves. It is African governments
that must ultimately embrace the kinds of
reforms that made other regions in the world
prosper. 
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